On July 11, World Population Day bore the stamp of population decline alarmism. Messages portraying current demographic trends as leading to civilization or economic collapse or human extinction are spreading—much like our Canadian wildfires. But unlike wildfires, these narratives are often more hypothetical, shaped by assumptions and interpretations rather than rooted in evidence.

Here is a recap of what global trends actually show: world population is projected to continue growing until the latter part of the 21st century, but at a slowing rate—adding over 2 billion more people by around the 2080s. For perspective, the entire global population was just 2.5 billion in 1950.

While global growth continues overall, countries are on very different demographic trajectories: 63 countries and areas—including China, Germany, and Japan—have already peaked; another 48 are projected to peak before 2054; and 126 others—including India, Nigeria, and Pakistan—are expected to continue growing beyond mid-century.

Canada is projected to grow through 2073, from 40 million in 2023 to somewhere between 47.1 and 87.2 million, depending largely on the migration policies we choose to adopt.

Generating appropriate policy responses to population trends requires an evidence-based approach and a long-term perspective— one that moves beyond snapshot fertility levels. This means recognising the hypothetical nature of demographic projections: while short-term forecasts (typically over 20 to 30 years) are generally reliable, mid- and long-term projections are inherently uncertain—an uncertainty often overlooked in discussions about population decline.

It also requires clarity around what fertility indicators measure. The total fertility rate (TFR), for instance, is a statistical estimate of how many children a hypothetical woman would have if she experienced the current year’s age-specific fertility rates throughout her reproductive life. It doesn’t reflect the real reproductive patterns of actual women. As childbearing is increasingly delayed, the TFR can appear artificially low. In Canada, the average age of mothers at delivery was 27 in 1980 and reached 31.6 in 2022—a trend that continues to rise. This postponement shifts births to later years, temporarily suppressing fertility rates until those delayed births occur. To understand how many children women have, we must look at completed fertility—the number of children born to a woman by the end of her reproductive years. But of course, that requires waiting until those years have passed.

Slower population growth can bring important benefits—such as increased labour productivity and more equitable wealth distribution. Contrary to the assumptions of traditional economic models, living standards can continue to rise even as the population gradually declines.

There is no reason, and no room, for panic about population decline. Instead, we should focus on current realities: promoting reproductive agency (the ability to make one’s own reproductive choices) and preparing for an ageing society. Fertility decisions are deeply personal and must be respected and protected, regardless of whether fertility rates are rising or falling. Older adults represent the fastest-growing demographic in Canada—but this need not spell doom. Instead, the challenges that ageing present offer the opportunity to develop forward-looking policies that support inclusion, wellbeing, and intergenerational solidarity. As Canadian ministries brace for spending cuts, a demographic and evidence-informed perspective calls for safeguard vital areas of investment: the health and wellbeing of older adults, and reproductive agency.